The costly trade theory predicts that it is much more difficult to exploit long-term private information than short-term. Thus, there is less long-term information impounded in prices. The managerial myopia theory predicts that a variety of short-term pressures, including inadequate information on long-term projects, cause asymetrically-informed corporate managers to underinvest in long-term projects. The introduction of long-term options called LEAPS provides a natural experiment to jointly test both theories, which are otherwise difficult to test. We conduct an event study around the introduction of LEAPS for a given stock and test whether corporate investment in long-term R&D / Sales increases in the years following the introduction. We find that over a two year period of time LEAPS firms increase their R&D / Sales between 23% and 28% ($125-$152 million annually) compared to matching non-LEAPS firms. The difference depends on the matching technique used. Two other proxies for long-term investment find similar increases. We find that the increase is positively related to LEAPS volume. We also find that the increase is larger in firms where R&D plays a larger and more strategic role. These results provide both statistically and economically significant support for the costly trade and managerial myopia theories.
Introduction
Shleifer and Vishny (1990) develop a "Costly Trade" theory that predicts that it is more difficult to exploit information whose public resolution is long-term rather than short-term. They develop a model of asymmetric information about the trading ability of an informed trader, which causes capital providers to ration capital availability to informed traders and charge a high cost of capital. This high cost of capital makes it especially difficult to exploit long-term private information rather short-term private information. With endogenous information acquisition, this difficulty in exploiting long-term private information causes stocks to impound less long-term information than short-term.
1 Stein (1988) develops a "Managerial Myopia" theory under which managers have an incentive to focus on short-run actions to prop up the current stock price in order to reduce the likelihood of a takeover and this leads them to underinvest in long-term projects. A wide variety of short-term pressures have been suggested as contributors to managerial myopia, including short-term trading by institutional traders, the short-term focus of security analysts, and the issue we consider, very little information being impounded into security prices about long-run projects. 2 We use the introduction of long-term options called LEAPS as a natural experiment to jointly test both theories, which are otherwise difficult to test.
It is difficult to empirically test the Costly Trade and Managerial Myopia theories
because it is difficult to separate long-term informational events and long-term management actions from short-term events and short-term management actions. An opportunity to make this separation is presented by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduction of longterm options. They are called Long Term Equity Appreciation Securities (LEAPS). LEAPS are 1 Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996) develop a complementary version of the Costly Trade theory. In their model, long-term private information is more risky to exploit than short-term information. For high enough values of risk aversion, this causes risk averse informed traders to choose to acquire short-term information only. That is, they forego trading in long-term information, because the utility cost is too high.
American-style, standardized, exchange-listed options on individual stocks. They are similar in every way to short-term options except that their maximum time to maturity (39 months) is nearly four times greater than short-terms options. LEAPS lower the cost of trading on long-term information because of the implicit leverage in options compared to the underlying stocks. That is, an investment in LEAPS allows one to make a much larger long-term bet than the same dollar investment in the underlying stocks. In theory, a lower cost of long-term trading should lead to more long-term informational efficiency and thus increase the incentive for management to invest in long-term projects.
This paper tests this theoretical prediction by performing an event study around the introduction of LEAPS trading on a given stock. We look at three proxies for long-term investment: (1) R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales, (2) R&D as percent of assets, and (3) the ratio of net property, plant and equipment divided by current assets (hereafter PP&E/CA).
Under the null hypothesis, there would be no increase in the three proxies in the years following the introduction of LEAPS. Under the alternative hypothesis, there would be an increase in the three proxies following the introduction. The CBOE exercises sole discretion over the selection of firms upon which to introduce LEAPS. The firms themselves have no influence over this selection process. We use matching samples formed in a variety of ways. Our results are robust to the alternative matching techniques we use.
We find that over a two year period of time LEAPS firms increase their R&D / Sales between 23% and 28% (annual R&D spending increases by a total of $125-$152 million) compared to matching non-LEAPS firms. Similarly, LEAPS firms increase their R&D / Assets between 20% and 22% compared to matching non-LEAPS firms. Also, LEAPS firms increase their PP&E/CA between 27% and 35% compared to matching non-LEAPS firms. The range of results depends upon the matching technique used. Our results are statistically significant in rejecting the null hypothesis and supporting the alternative. We find both statistically and economically significant support for the Costly Trade and Managerial Myopia theories.
For the subset of firms with high prior R&D spending (> 3% of sales), we find that higher LEAPS volume in the year of introduction leads to greater increases in R&D/Sales intensity down the road. This supports the theory that a higher volume of long-term options should lead to more long-term information being impounded into the price, which should lead to a greater increase in R&D intensity.
We also find that firms with high prior R&D spending (> 3% of sales) have a larger subsequent increase in R&D spending than firms with low prior R&D spending (< 3% of sales).
This supports the idea that LEAPS have a greater impact on firms where R&D plays a larger and more strategic role that they do on firms where R&D is smaller and more peripheral.
Our findings have important implications for boards, option exchanges, investors, and policy makers. Boards might encourage options exchanges to introduce long-term options.
Options exchanges can use the results of this paper to better understand existing long-term options and to help design new derivative securities. Investors should update their security valuations based on the trade imbalance (between buys vs. sells) in LEAPS. Policymakers should consider that policy changes that encourage / discourage LEAPS introductions will have a corresponding impact on long-term corporate investment.
The existing empirical literature on the introduction of option trading investigates whether the introduction of option trade increases the firm's share price efficiency by increasing incentives to collect private information and trade on it. Jennings and Starks (1986) find that market prices adjust more rapidly to new information for firms that have exchange-listed options than for those firms without option trade. Damodaran and Lim (1991) find that prices adjust more rapidly to new information after options are listed. Skinner (1989) finds that the reaction to earnings reports is smaller after options are listed. Manaster and Rendleman (1982) suggest that the benefits of trading options include leverage, lower transactions costs, and fewer short-sale restrictions. They tested the hypothesis that the informed trader prefers trading options on stocks to trading stocks. They found that option price changes help predict stock price changes, consistent with the hypothesis that arbitrageurs force the firm's stock price to adjust to information in option prices. Their results imply that the introduction of a long-term option would be associated with an increase in the quantity and precision of long-term information impounded into current share price. All of these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that option trade increases the incentive to invest in information about the firm. We contribute by testing the logical extension of this literature that the introduction of trade on a long-term option should increase the efficiency of stock price with respect to long-term information.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the introduction of LEAPS. Section II presents the empirical specification. Section III presents the sample and descriptive statistics.
Section IV presents the main results. Section V examines the relation between LEAPS volume and changes in R&D intensity. Section VI presents an additional robustness check. Section VII concludes. 
I. The Introduction of LEAPS

II. Empirical Specification
Following the initial introduction of LEAPS trade on a limited number of stocks in 1990, LEAPS were introduced on additional stocks in the following years. A sample of firms upon which LEAPS were introduced is collected and referred to as the "Introduction Sample". The percent change in the firm's annual investments in projects with long-term cash flows is examined around the year in which LEAPs trade was introduced.
Research and Development expense is used as the empirical proxy for investment in long-term projects for three reasons. First, theoretical work on corporate long-term investment by Stein (1989) , Noe and Rebello (1997) and Bebchuk and Stole (1993) The percentage change in the firm's annual R&D is divided by sales to control for size effects. R&D/Sales is referred to as the "R&D Intensity" in what follows. The year in which the LEAPS trade is introduced is referred to as year zero. A (-1,1) window is used to measure the change in R&D intensity from one year prior to the introduction to the year following the introduction to examine the percentage change in R&D intensity. As firms may be slow to adjust R&D in response to an introduction, an alternative (-1,2) window is used. This measures the change in R&D intensity from the year preceding the introduction to the second year following the introduction. The hypothesis, H1, that R&D intensity does not increase when LEAPS trade is introduced on the firm's shares is tested using a one-tailed T-test.
A set of control firms is used to control for other sources of variation in the firm's R&D intensity. The control firms are identified by matching the sample firms on: (1) industry, (2) market-to-book equity, and (3) cash divided by assets. Market-to-book proxies for the level of growth opportunities faced by the firm. Cash divided by assets proxies for the ability of the firm to make R&D investments without accessing the capital market. A firm with greater investment opportunities and/or more cash may, all else equal, increase R&D for reasons unrelated to the LEAPS introduction.
Data on financial statement items including market-to-book equity, cash, assets, and SIC code are obtained from the Compustat annual files. Each LEAPS firm is matched with a control firm in year -1. Therefore the match occurs prior to the LEAPS introduction.
The matching technology employed by Huang and Stoll (1996) is utilized to select a match firm. Each firm in the LEAPS introduction sample is matched with all potential match firms in the same 4-digit SIC code. For each matched pair, the following match score S is calculated as
Where MtB is market-to-book equity, LEAPS refers to a firm in the LEAPS sample, i indexes LEAPS sample firms and NoLEAPS refers to a matching firm in the same SIC code. The matching firm with the smallest matching score is chosen.
As a robustness check, an alternative control set is constructed by matching on industry as defined at a 3-digit SIC code level. The S score matching procedure is repeated at the 3-digit SIC code level. In both cases, the percent change in R&D intensity net of the match firm is calculated for both SIC code levels.
In addition to examining the percentage change in R&D spending net of a match firm, we examine the percentage change net of that of a portfolio of match firms. Control portfolios are identified at both the 4-digit and 3-digit SIC code levels. The control portfolio is defined as all firms in the firm's SIC code, for which either market-to-book or cash/total assets are within 20% of the value of either variable for the LEAPS firm.
III. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The sample of LEAPS introductions is drawn from the period that begins with the first introduction of LEAPS, in October 1990, and ends in 2002. We begin with a sample of 378 firms upon which the Chicago Board Options Exchange has introduced these long-term options.
The date for each LEAPS introduction is located on either Lexus-Nexus or Dow Jones
Interactive.
Please insert Table I about here   Table I : 9 in 1990, 4 in 1991, 10 in 1992, 11 in 1993, 17 in 1995, 5 in 1996, 12 in 1997, 4 in 1998, 21 For any level of LEAPS annualized volume, the LEAPS volume may be more important to the resolution of information problems for a firm that has a lower level of equity option trade than to a firm with higher levels of ordinary option trade. The LEAPS volume percentage attempts to control for the LEAPS volume relative to total equity option volume.
Each of the proxies is collected for years 0, 1 and 2. The average LEAPS security trades 10,554 contracts a year in year 0, 24,890 contracts in year 1 and 31,607 contracts in year 2. As a percentage of annual equity option volume, annualized LEAPS volume makes up 4.2% of equity option volume in year 0, 13.0% in year 1 and 8.6% in year 2.
Panel C of Table I presents The median number of firms operating in the firm's industry defined by its 4-digit SIC code is 43. The average matching score calculated at the 3-digit levels is smaller than the average matching score calculated at the 4-digit level. While the 4-digit matching firm may not have the smallest score, it may be in a line of business that is more similar than is the 3-digit match firm.
The industry concentration of LEAPS introductions discussed above suggests that industry controls may be important when isolating the effects of LEAPS.
IV. Main Results
A. Dollars of R&D
We examine dollar change in R&D over two windows surrounding year 0. The two windows are denoted as (-1,1) and (-1,2). The (-1,1) window measures the dollar change in the firm's annual R&D from the fiscal year prior to the introduction to the fiscal year immediately subsequent to the fiscal year during which the introduction occurred. The (-1,2) window is defined analogously and ends in year 2.
please insert Table II about here   Table II 
B. R&D / Sales
Next, we examine the percent change in R&D/Sales. Results are presented in Panel A, the mean percent change in R&D/Sales for LEAPS firms is 22.32% over (-1,1) and 21.19% over (-1,2). The mean percent change for the control firms are all negative, ranging from -6.25% to -2.38%. The same pattern holds for the medians, but at a lower level.
Panel B reports the differences in percent changes of alternative measures of long-term investment. For (-1,1), the difference in percent change of R&D/sales net of the 4-digit control firm is 25.10% (p-value < 0.0062), and 25.57% (p-value < 0.0010) net of the 4-digit portfolio.
Results net of the 3-digit control firm and control portfolio are qualitatively similar.
For (-1,2), the difference in percent change of R&D/sales net of the 4-digit control firm is 23.57% (p-value < 0.0040), and 25.63% (p-value < 0.0004) net of the 4-digit control portfolio.
Results net of the 3-digit control firm and control portfolio are qualitatively similar. The results of examining median differences in percent changes are qualitatively the same although of smaller magnitude and nearly all are significant at the 5% level in the signed-rank test.
Overall, these results reject H1 and provide strong support of the joint theories of Costly
Trade and Managerial Myopia. We conclude that the increase for LEAPS is significantly and robustly greater than the control firms, however defined.
C. R&D / Assets
For additional robustness, we examine R&D scaled by assets rather than by sales. In Panel A, the mean percent change in R&D/Assets for LEAPS firms is 12.59% over (-1,1) and 16.28% over (-1,2). The mean percent change for the control firms are nearly all negative, ranging from -6.75% to 2.13%. The same pattern holds for the medians, but at a lower level.
Panel B reports the differences in percent changes of alternative measures of long-term investment. For (-1,1), the difference in percent change of R&D/sales net of the 4-digit control firm is 10.46% (p-value < 0.0957), and 12.84% (p-value < 0.0128) net of the 4-digit portfolio.
For (-1,2), the differences are 22.47% (p-value < 0.0116), and 20.41% (p-value < 0.0088), respectively. Results net of the 3-digit control firm and control portfolio are qualitatively similar. The results of examining median differences in percent changes are qualitatively the same although of smaller magnitude and nearly all are significant at the 5% level using the signed-rank test.
Overall, these results provide robust confirmation of rejecting H1 and supporting the joint theories of Costly Trade and Managerial Myopia.
D. PP&E/CA
We construct another proxy for the firm's relative choice of long-term investment to short-term investment using the ratio of net property, plant and equipment divided by current assets (hereafter PP&E/CA). If subsequent to LEAPS introduction firms shift their assets more towards the long-term, we expect to see this ratio increase. We examine the change in this ratio around LEAPS introduction.
For (-1,1), the difference in percent change of PP&E/CA net of the 4-digit control firm is 
V. The Relationship Between R&D Intensity Changes and LEAPS Volume
Theoretically, greater volume of long-term options should lead to more long-term information being impounded into the price, which should lead to a greater increase in R&D intensity. We test this theoretical prediction by analyzing the cross-sectional relationship between the "longness" of option volume and the change in R&D intensity. Our proxy for the longness of option volume is annualized LEAPS volume in year 0 as a percentage of total equity option volume in year 0.
Previous research on managerial myopia, using R&D, has often screened out firms with lower levels of R&D to focus on those with a more economically significant level of R&D spending. It is possible that LEAPS volume is related to the change in R&D intensity for those firms for which the level of R&D is more economically significant. Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Lundstrum (2002) both examine changes in R&D/sales to test theories of managerial myopia and both require that R&D/sales meet some industry minimum levels of R&D intensity.
Dechow and Sloan implement a 5% R&D/sales minimum while Lundstrum uses a 3%
minimum. Dechow and Sloan use the minimum intensity "…to identify industries in which large Research and Development expenditures are common". Lundstrum argues for the 3% minimum to be sure that "…the level of R&D expenditures are significant in the industry-year".
A minimum R&D intensity screen is an appropriate screen here as any potential mis-pricing associated with R&D spending is more likely to be more important to the manager when the level of spending exceeds some economically significant level.
We examine the relationship between the change in R&D intensity and LEAPS volume after controlling for year effects and the level of R&D intensity in year -1. R&D intensity in year -1 of 3% corresponds to approximately the twentieth sample percentile of R&D intensity.
Screening out those observations for which year -1 R&D/sales does not exceed 3% of sales leaves a sample of 70 observations. We estimate the following regression including only those firms for which R&D/sales exceeds 3 percent. Results appear in Using the full sample we examine whether there is some minimum level of LEAPS volume for which LEAPS volume is significantly related to the change in R&D intensity. We use the full sample to re-estimate equation (2) and find that the coefficient on the LEAPS volume percentage is not significantly different from zero (results not reported).
We conclude that for those firms that have an economically significant level of R&D intensity, the change in R&D intensity around LEAPS introduction is increasing in LEAPS volume in the preceding year. Results are consistent with the theories, and consistent with the hypothesis that the change in R&D intensity is positively related to the LEAPS volume in the prior year.
VI. An Additional Robustness Check
We examine the evidence on whether the change in R&D intensity is greater for those firms that have higher level of R&D intensity before LEAPS are introduced. The idea is that R&D may have a more central and strategic role for high R&D intensity firms. Whereas, it may play be more of a peripheral role for low R&D intensity firms. Hence, LEAPS may have a greater impact on high R&D intensity firms than on low firms. We again partition the sample into low intensity firms, defined here as those firms with R&D/sales less than 3 percent, and high R&D intensity firms, those firms with R&D/sales of 3 percent or greater. Table IV reports the mean difference in % change in R&D/sales net of control firm(s) separately for low intensity firms (19 firms) and high intensity firms (75 firms).
Please insert Table IV about here For (-1,1), the difference in % change for LEAPS net of the best match firm in 4-digit industry is 21.65%, but is not statistically significant (p-value < 0.2338) for low intensity firms. This insignificance is likely due to the very small sample size (19). For high intensity firms, the difference is 25.97% and statistically significant (p-value < 0.0145). Results are similar for the (-1,2) window and 3-digit match firm and net of portfolios. While the sample size for low intensity firms is small, it appears that the high intensity firms experience an increase in intensity of greater magnitude than do the low intensity firms.
VII. Conclusion
Shleifer and Vishny (1990) develop a model in which the combination of mis-pricing of the shares of a firm which invest in projects with long-term cash flows, combined with the firm's manager's desire to avoid under-pricing of the firm's current stock price result in underinvestment in projects with long-term cash flows. By reducing the cost of trade on long-term information, the introduction of exchange-trading in a long-term stock option on the firm should result in less mis-pricing of long-term information and a corresponding increase of corporate investment in projects with long-term cash flows.
This paper tests the hypothesis that corporate investment in long-term projects increases around the introduction of trade on a long-term stock option. We find an abnormal growth in R&D intensity ranging from 23% to 28% (annual R&D spending increases by a total of $125-$152 million) over the two years subsequent to the introduction of LEAPS. This is consistent with the hypothesis that capital market imperfections may play a significant role in deterring firms from pursuing projects with long term cash flows. This highlights the importance of the costs of collecting and trading on long-term information, and suggests that the level of information problems in capital markets have a deterrent effect on long-term investment.
We find that for those firms that have an economically significant level of R&D intensity, the change in R&D intensity around LEAPS introduction is increasing in LEAPS volume. Our conclusions are robust to the choice of proxy for long-term investment and to the matching technique used to identify control firms or control portfolios.
We also find that firms with high prior R&D spending have a larger subsequent increase in R&D spending. This supports the idea that LEAPS have a greater impact on firms where R&D plays a larger and more strategic role.
The results here suggest that understanding the positive externalities associated with the introduction of option trade is crucial to identifying all of the important costs and benefits of option trade. The positive impact of the introduction of these derivatives includes reducing 20 barriers to long-term investment at the firm level. This potentially implies a role for regulatory policy in influencing the level of economy-wide private, long-term investment.
Long-term options appear to help solve information problems that impede firm's ability to invest in long-term projects. LEAPS trade allows these pent-up R&D projects to be pursued. Year 1990 Year 1991 Year 1992 Year 1993 Year 1994 Year 1995 Year 1996 Year 1997 Year 1998 Year 2001 
